Legal Dictionary ..

The law is often esoteric, eccentric and remote. From time to time, there are movements to simplify the law, usually under the byword of "plain language". However, the task is daunting and likely impracticable given the depth and breadth the law has taken.

At the same time, ignorance of the meaning of a legal word can have grave or very expensive consequences.

Duhaime's Law Dictionary is designed to offer one-stop shopping to all of us who occasionally need to know what a certain legal word means, because our rights stand to be affected by a reference to it, or because of employment or academic research requirements.

As a lawyer, I write to my professional standards; I want each definition to be lawyer-ready.

Still, all definitions are easy to read and all have been painstakingly researched and written in plain language by lawyer Lloyd Duhaime. In most cases, the definition contains samples of the word used in a law or how it may have been described or used in a law book or a case. Where available or known to the author, HTML links are provided allowing the reader to go directly to the cited case.

We are humbled by the response to the Law Dictionary since it was launched in 1995. Hundreds of other web sites link to it including universities, government departments and libraries. It has also received judicial sanction. Constantly looking for a better product, we believe that this is the best online law dictionary in the world and we want to keep it that way.

Our website ..


http://www.duhaime.org/legaldictionary.aspx?lk=mm

Answer the Question !!

Malaysian Employment Law

WHAT IS EMPLOYMENT ?
Employment means work or service performed by an individual to the task at hand for another person or entity in exchange for wages or other remuneration.

WHAT IS EMPLOYMENT LAW ?
Employment Law is the law which regulates the operation of the labour market in general and the employment relationship between employers and employees in particular. Examples include hiring process, suspension from work, maternity rights, layoff and wages.

The obligations and rights of an employment contract are covered by the Employment law.

When an offer for employment is made by an employer to an employee, the law governing the relationship between an employee and an employer begins.

WHAT ARE THE BASIC TERMS USED TO DESCRIBE THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP ?
An employer in relation to an employee or a workman, means a person by whom the employee or workman is employed. An employer obtains the services of another to perform work and has direct control of the way in which the work is to be done.

An employer shall provide the means through which the services will be performed such as providing a place where the work is to be performed and tools required to get the job done.

Contract of service means any agreement, whether express or implied, and if express, whether oral or in writing where the employer agrees to employ and the employee agrees to be employed and includes an apprenticeship contract.

In general, an employee means a person who has entered into or works under a contract of employment. There are different interpretations for the term, employee, in different Acts governing the labour market in Malaysia. Those interpretations will determine whether you are an employee protected under the scope of an Act.

Where an employee begins employment with an employer and for a period of more than one month, such employee must be given a written contract of employment with particulars of the terms and conditions of employment including the notice period required to terminate the contract of employment.

The Law Of Ueki

The Law of Ueki (うえきの法則, Ueki no Hōsoku?) is a Japanese manga series by Tsubasa Fukuchi. It was first serialised in the manga magazine Weekly Shōnen Sunday in 2002 and ended in 2004. Sixteen tankōbon volumes was compiled and published by Shogakukan. An anime adaptation was first broadcast on TV Tokyo on April 4, 2005, ended with 51 episodes on March 27, 2006. It was produced by Studio Deen. A manga sequel, The Law of Ueki Plus (うえきの法則プラス, Ueki no Hōsoku PURASU?), continues the series as of September 2005 by the same author and in the same magazine.

The manga was licensed for distribution in North America by Viz Media, while the anime adaptation was licensed by Geneon. On July 3, 2008, Geneon Entertainment and Funimation Entertainment announced an agreement to distribute select titles in North America. While Geneon Entertainment will still retain the license, Funimation Entertainment will assume exclusive rights to the manufacturing, marketing, sales and distribution of select titles. The Law of Ueki was one of several titles involved in the deal.[1] ImaginAsian TV broadcast the anime series to the American audience starting early 2007.


Kosuke Ueki (植木 耕助, Ueki Kōsuke?) Voiced by: Romi Park (Japanese), Cole Howard (English)
Kosuke Ueki is the main character in the series. He is in Class 1-C at Hinokuni Junior High School. Ueki's ability is given to him by Kobayashi (a.k.a. Mr. K), who is also Ueki's homeroom teacher. He is also seen wearing pinkish-red shoes during his first fight with Robert Haydn.

Ueki is an unusually calm individual, and doesn't care about what happens to him. He can be found snoozing in class, letting children use him as a target for shooting soccer balls (or in one case, a surfboard),and also calling the police without panicking when he faces a gang of rowdy teenagers. However, he cares for people around them, even going as far as saving Robert Haydn from falling debris in the Dougra Mansion. He also seems have a strong battle sense, as he often finds his opponent's weak points, or unique strategies to defeat them.

According to a short profile of the main characters of The Law of Ueki (published in the end of manga vol. 16 by the author), Ueki's hobbies include cleaning up his town. In the first volume of the manga, Ueki is seen planting trees in the town park.

Ueki is a genuinely kind person who is always trying to help people. He is also actually a heavenly being sent to Earth by his father in order to take part in this tournament (but unfortunately, his father did not get to become a king candidate so Ueki got picked by Mr. K instead). Being a heavenly being allows him powers beyond his tree-making skills.

During the battle to win the talent of blank, Ueki discovers that he is not just a celestial, but a neo-celestial. Neo-celestials have more power than normal celestials and Ueki uses that power to win battles creatively.

Ai Mori (森 あい, Mori Ai?) Voiced by: Tomoko Kawakami (Japanese), Lori Barnes-Smith (English)
Ai Mori is one of Ueki's classmates at Hinokuni Junior High School. When in a casual mood, Mori is usually upbeat and friendly, although she is often shown with a very shallow side, initially believing that all power-users (with the exception of Ueki) are dangerous enemies that can't be trusted. Still, Mori cares deeply for her friends, especially Ueki. She discovers Ueki's power early on, coming to a rather unusual conclusion and at first believing him to be an alien. Upon learning of the competition Ueki is in, she decides to back him up, to keep him from losing all his talents and disappearing because of it.

Tort Law

.,. Tort Law .,.

A tort is a legal wrong. Tort law is a branch of the civil law; the other main branches are contract and property law. Whereas in criminal law the plaintiff is always the state and the defendant, if found guilty of a crime, is punished by the state, in civil law the dispute is typically between private parties (though the government can also sue and be sued). In the case of torts, the plaintiff is the victim of an alleged wrong and the unsuccessful defendant is either directed by the court to pay damages to the plaintiff (the usual remedy) or else to desist from the wrongful activity (so-called "injunctive relief"). Examples include intentional torts such as battery, defamation, and invasion of privacy and unintentional torts such as negligence. Most contemporary tort theory focuses on the legal consequences of accidents, where the relevant forms of liability are negligence and strict liability. This entry likewise focuses on these forms of liability.


According to the principle of corrective justice, an individual who has wronged another has a duty to repair the wrongful losses occasioned thereby. The corrective justice account thus illuminates not just the bilateral structure of tort litigation, but tort law's emphasis on harm caused rather than harm risked.

Arguably, central to tort law is the moral notion of ‘ownership’, not the moral notion of ‘blame’. Tort law picks out a particular way of recognizing one's ‘ownership’ of some of the untoward outcomes for which one is responsible. It does this by imposing a duty to make good the costs one's wrongs have imposed on those one has wronged. And so, rather than trying to determine whether the injurer has satisfied the conditions that would warrant blaming him for what he has done, tort law inquires into whether the injurer has satisfied conditions necessary to impose on him a duty to repair the plaintiff's loss. In short, the law asks whether the loss is attributable to him as his doing: whether, to use the currently fashionable phrase, he is ‘outcome responsible’ for it. In the prevailing view, to be outcome responsible, the outcome must be foreseeable and avoidable.[2] This emphasis on the ascription of responsibility for outcomes rather than on ascriptions of blame or culpability makes sense within the corrective justice account of tort law in ways in which it would not within a traditional retributive view.

According to economic analysis, all liabilities are simply one or another cost. There is no significant normative difference among punishments, sanctions, duties of repair and taxes. All that matters is the way in which each impacts rational decision-making. But there are important normative differences among these kinds of costs that this crude picture misses. Tort law imposes a duty of repair, and while it is true that a person who is under a duty to act is constrained in the set of actions open to him, duties are neither punishments nor sanctions. In contrast with tort law, criminal wrongdoers are subject to punishment for their crimes, and while this means that they are not at liberty to prevent others from punishing them, they have no duty to be punished or to permit others to punish them.

There are other significant differences between the duty of repair in torts and punishment as a criminal sanction. The duty of repair in torts is a debt of repayment one owes those one has wronged and has injured as a result. Like other debts of repayment, it can be discharged by third parties — and not only if the debt holder has authorized repayment. By contrast ‘debts’ incurred as a result of criminal mischief cannot be discharged by third parties. I cannot serve your prison sentence justly. To be sure, I might be imprisoned for a crime you have committed, and my love for you may lead me to substitute myself for you when the time comes for you to begin your prison term. But both cases involve injustice: the first to me, the second to the world as a whole.

Nor can one guard against liability to criminal sanction by purchasing insurance. In contrast, it is common to purchase insurance to guard against the burdens of tort liability. Indeed, in some cases purchasing third party insurance is mandatory. Not only is it a mistake to lump together sanctions, taxes and liability judgments as interchangeable implements in the legal reformer's tool box, the practices for which each is appropriate are governed by different norms. Failure to notice the differences in character of these ‘costs’ disables one from understanding the underlying norms governing our differing legal and social institutions.

The emphasis on duties of repair as well as on the range of ways in which those duties can be discharged consonant with justice is illuminated by the principle of corrective justice in ways in which these features of tort law are not illuminated by either retributive or economic theory. The claim is that corrective justice explains the relationship between the duty to prevent or avoid harm on the one hand, and the duty to repair its costs on the other. It is a principle that grounds duties of repair, not the duties of care that are the bases of those duties of repair. Though it grounds duties of repair, it does not mandate a mechanism by which those duties are to be discharged.

It is tempting to think of corrective justice as a goal of tort law in the same way that economists think of efficiency or optimal deterrence as a goal of tort law. The better view is that corrective justice is not a goal of the law in the way in which efficiency might be. Rather, corrective justice itself is a principle of justification; it seeks to articulate grounds upon which a certain category of duties rest. It claims that certain duties of repair or repayment are grounded on one's responsibility for them. The grounds of the duty to repair are: (1) the fact that one has a prior duty to take into account the interests of another and to mitigate one's own conduct accordingly; (2) the fact that one has failed to do so; (3) the fact that one's failure to do so results (in an appropriate way) in harm to another; and (4) the harm that results is one for which can be charged to an agent as his doing, or, in the contemporary jargon, for which he is outcome responsible. No one claims that these grounds must be satisfied if ever an agent is to have a duty of repair or repayment. Corrective justice grounds some, but, very likely, not all of our duties of repair.

If this is the way to think about corrective justice, how ought we think about its relationship to fault and strict liability? The question is whether the duties of repair and the conditions under which they arise in tort law are ones which are by and large grounded in the principle of corrective justice so conceived. As I argued above, both strict and fault liability in torts involve wrongs, that is, the breach of an underlying duty of care. The fault in fault liability is not a modifier of the character of the injurer but a constraint on the content of the underlying duty of care he owes the plaintiff. The difference between fault and strict liability standards is a difference in the nature of the content of the underlying duties we owe one another.

In strict liability, the defendant is thought to owe the plaintiff a duty of the form A not to harm by X-ing. It is natural to think that the duty is absolute or unconstrained. But it is in fact constrained in several ways, and in each of the ways it is constrained, the duty in strict liability resonates with the conditions of a duty of repair in corrective justice. The blaster is liable strictly, not to everyone who is injured by his conduct, but only to those to whom he owed a duty not to harm by blasting: those who fall within the ambit of foreseeable risk. Second, he is not liable to all those that he injures because he blasts, but only to those that are injured in the appropriate way by his blasting. In strict liability, there are the requirements of a wrong to a plaintiff (class), a harm, the appropriate causal connection between the two, and other elements of responsibility for the outcome, including forseeability and avoidability.

Case Law

JU and Another v See Tho Kai Yin
[2005] 4 SLR 96; [2005] SGHC 140

Decision Date: 08 Aug 2005
Court: High Court
Coram: Lai Siu Chiu J
Counsel: V K Rai (V K Rai and Partners) for the plaintiffs, Lek Siang Pheng and Terence Tan (Rodyk and Davidson) for the defendants



Introduction

1 The first plaintiff is a Singaporean and a businesswoman by occupation. She had worked in Japan since the 1980s, travelled frequently (to Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan and China) and spent most of her time outside Singapore.

2 The second plaintiff is the first plaintiff’s son by the first plaintiff’s husband (“the husband”) who is a Chinese national from Shanghai. The first plaintiff married the husband in a customary ceremony in China in October 2000. The first plaintiff was then 43 years of age, her birth date being 27 June 1957. The husband was ten years younger than her, a fact which prompted opposition to the marriage from the husband’s family. The parties’ marriage was registered in Singapore on 28 November 2001.

3 The second plaintiff was born by Caesarean delivery on 23 January 2002 in Singapore and suffers from Down’s syndrome. As at the date of the trial, he was about two and a half years of age.

4 See Tho Kai Yin (the first defendant) is a medical doctor who practises as an obstetrician and gynaecologist under the name and style of The See Tho Clinic for Women (“the Clinic”) at 6 Napier Road, #07-11/12, Gleneagles Medical Centre, Singapore 258499. He is a visiting consultant attached to the Department of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, National University of Singapore, with teaching responsibilities. The Family Clinic shares premises with the Clinic. However, it is a separate medical practice run by family physician Saleha Johari, who is the wife of the first defendant. When the first defendant took the stand, counsel for the plaintiffs sensibly informed the court that his clients withdrew their claim against The Family Clinic.


The issues:

62 There are three issues I need to determine in this case:

Conclusion:
(a) Did the first defendant owe a duty to the first plaintiff to schedule an appointment for her at the earliest possible date?

(b) Was the first defendant’s management of the first plaintiff’s pregnancy up to 24 November 2001 negligent or in breach of contract?

(c) If the answer to (b) is in the positive, did the breach of the duty of care cause the plaintiffs’ alleged losses?


dismiss the claims of both plaintiffs with one set of costs to the defendants.

Malaysia Tax Law

BASIS OF TAXATION

Income tax is generally imposed on a territorial basis in that only income accruing in or derived from Malaysia is liable to tax. However, resident individuals and other non-corporate entities are also taxed on foreign-sourced income remitted into Malaysia. Foreign-sourced income received by resident companies are not subject to tax even if such income is remitted to Malaysia.

Income derived by tax residents from businesses of banking, insurance and air/sea transport operations are assessable on a world income scope.

Relief from double taxation of foreign-sourced income is available by means of bilateral credit if there is a tax treaty or unilateral relief if there is no tax treaty. The relief is restricted to the lower of Malaysian tax payable on the foreign-sourced income or foreign tax paid if there is a treaty or one-half of the foreign tax paid there is no treaty.



Sources of Income Liable to Tax
Sources of income which are liable to income tax are as follows:
Gains and profits from trade, profession and business
Salaries, remunerations, gains and profits from an employment
Dividends, interests or discounts
Rents, royalties or premiums
Pensions, annuities or other periodic payments/li>
Other gains or profits of an income nature not mentioned above.
Chargeable income is arrived at after adjusting for expenses incurred wholly and exclusively in the production of the income. Specific provisions or reserves for anticipated losses or contingent liabilities are not tax deductible. No deduction for book depreciation is allowed although capital allowances are granted. Unabsorbed losses may be carried forward indefinitely to offset against future income.


Personal Income Tax
All individuals are liable to tax on income accrued in, derived from or remitted to Malaysia. The rate of tax depends on the resident status of the individual which is determined by the duration of his stay in the country (as stipulated under Section 7 in the Income Tax Act 1967).

Resident Individual
A resident individual is taxed on his chargeable income at graduated rates from 2% to 30% after the deduction of tax reliefs. However, an individual with chargeable income of less than RM2,500 is taxed at zero rate.
Personal Reliefs
The chargeable income of an individual resident is arrived at by deducting from his total income the following personal reliefs:


(a) Personal = RM5,000 (a further relief of RM5,000 if the taxpayer is a disabled person)

(b) Wife = RM3,000 (a further relief of RM2,500 if the wife is a disabled person)

(c) Medical expenses of parents up to a maximum of RM5,000. Medical expenses for serious illnesses for individual, wife or child up to a maximum of RM5,000.

(d) Expenditure for purchase of basic support equipment for the individual, his wife, child or parent who is disabled the up to a maximum of RM5,000

(e) Unmarried children below the age of 18 = RM800 per child

The maximum relief for unmarried children (regardless of age) receiving full-time education in universities and institutions of higher education in Malaysia is four times the normal relief.

(f) Incapacitated children RM5,000 per child

(g) Contributions to the Employees Provident Fund and insurance or takaful premiums for life policies are allowed a maximum total tax relief of RM5,000. A further tax relief of RM2,000 is given for insurance or takaful premiums with respect to medical and educational purposes.


A married woman whose income is separately assessed generally has her overall tax liability reduced, although this may not always be the case. The separate assessment covers all her income sources. She may, however, elect for joint assessment, in which case, the husband is given a wife relief of RM3,000.

Tax rebate
Tax liability of a resident individual is reduced by rebates which are granted as follows:


(a) For an individual with a chargeable income not exceeding RM10,000, a rebate of RM110 is given. A further rebate of RM60 is given for his wife. A wife who is assessed separately will be entitled to a rebate of RM110 if her chargeable income does not exceed RM10,000.

(b) The equivalent of amount paid in respect of any zakat, fitrah or other Islamic religious dues which are obligatory.

(c) A sum of RM400 for the purchase of a computer by an individual or wife.

(d) The amount of fee paid to the government for the issue of an employment pass, visit pass or work permit.
Non-resident Individual
Generally, a nonresident individual is liable to tax at the rate of 30% and he is not entitled to any personal relief. He is entitled to claim tax rebate only for item (d) as stated in para 4.1 above. However, for the following types of income, nonresident individuals are subject to a withholding tax which is a final tax.

New UAE insurance law

New UAE insurance law

The long-awaited new insurance law to revamp the regulation of the UAE’s insurance sector was issued in February 2007. Federal Law 6 of 2007 (the New Insurance Law) will replace the ageing Law 9 of 1984 (the Old Insurance Law), and hopefully usher in a new era of regulation for the UAE insurance industry.

The main purpose of the New Insurance Law is to establish an Insurance Commission which will be responsible for the ongoing regulation of the insurance industry in the UAE, which will include having responsibility for the licensing and supervision of all insurance companies, insurance brokers, insurance agents, insurance consultants operating in the UAE, along with other experts in the insurance service industry, such as loss adjusters and actuaries.

The Commission replaces the UAE’s Ministry of Economy, whose insurance section has until now been tasked with the responsibility of regulation of this sector. It has been a widely-held view for some time by those in the industry that the Ministry’s regulation of the sector has been sporadic and inadequate, and that the insurance section has been under-staffed and under-skilled. In an era where regulation has come to the fore worldwide it is widely perceived that regulation of the UAE insurance industry has historically fallen well wide of the mark.

It is certainly hoped that the Commission will introduce a modern and up to date approach to the regulation of this vital pillar of the economy. Much will depend in due course on the quality and calibre of the staff employed by the Commission. The Director-General of the Commission has not yet been named.

Effective date and transition periods
The New Insurance law will come into effect six months after its issue (i.e. August 2007). Although the new law provides that it will replace the Old Insurance Law, the old law and its regulations will remain in place until new regulations are issued under the New Insurance Law.

Furthermore, the New Insurance Law provides for a transition period of up to two years for those governed by it to adjust their status and practices, and introduces specific transition periods in respect of specific changes.

The model for the Insurance Commission
The New Insurance Law and the model for the Commission appears to be based on the Jordanian Insurance Commission, which was put in place in 1999 and has had complimentary reviews in the region to date. The Jordanian Insurance Commission maintains an up to date website with laws and regulations published in English and Arabic.

Structure of the UAE Insurance Commission
The Commission does not appear to be intended to form part of a wider financial services regulatory body. Responsibility for the Commission still falls to the Ministry of Economy, although the Commission will have its own legal status. The Commission will have a board of directors comprising five Government appointees, including one appointee from the UAE Central bank, and five nominees from the private sector, including one nominee from the Emirates Insurance Association. The Commission will be headed up by a Director-General, whose appointment has not yet been announced.

The Commission’s responsibilities are set out in the New Insurance Law and include:

• Formulating and issuing regulations for the insurance industry;
• Implementing a code of conduct for the industry;
• Approval and processing for licensing of insurance companies and other entities in the industry;
• Determining policies and procedures, including solvency margins, accounting policies, investment rules, reinsurance standards and other matters affecting the regulation of the industry.

There is no indication as to when the Commission will be formed, but we understand the Ministry of Economy is keen to see its legal formation by September 2007. It is certainly hoped that the Commission will employ well-qualified staff to ensure that the standard of regulation that it introduces is in keeping with international standards. It is also hoped that the Commission will liaise with international bodies such as the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS).

Specific provisions of the New Insurance Law
Some of the specific provisions, including certain changes introduced by the New Insurance law are the following:

• The new law retains provisions requiring “property and funds located in the State or liabilities arising therefrom” to be insured by UAE-registered insurers;
• There are no restrictions that apply to the reinsurance of risks in or from the UAE;
• The new law reduces the number of categories of insurance from six to three (property, liability and life);
• The activities of entities registered in the ‘free zones’ are restricted to reinsurance (presumably a reference to DIFC);
• The new law prohibits the sale of both life and general insurance by the same insurance company, subject to a five-year grace period;
• The new law does not specify any minimum percentage UAE shareholding required in national insurers (presently 75%);
• Representative offices for foreign insurers are to be allowed;
• Security deposits for insurers have been increased with a maximum cap of AED6m;
• All insurance policies are required to be issued in Arabic – translations into other languages are permitted;
• Liquidation and insolvency provisions in the new law have been substantially widened, along with provisions relating to the restructuring, merger and acquisition and run-off of insurance businesses.

Comment
The issue of the New Insurance Law is certainly a welcome event for the local UAE insurance market. The model that appears to have been adopted does not follow that of a unified financial services body of which insurance is regarded as a type of financial service, which is the current trend in worldwide regulation and has been adopted elsewhere in the GCC such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, the DIFC and QFC.

The New Insurance Law does not provide much by way of detail as to what form the regulation of the industry will take. There appear to be a number of confusing and unhelpful provisions in the new law. However, how far the regulation of the industry is able to raise the bar from the current inadequate standards will depend to a very large degree on the quality of the staff and management of the new Insurance Commission.

The first 30 Years !!

][.! Lawyer jokes .!][

Who would steal?
The two partners in a law firm were having lunch when suddenly one of them jumped up and said, "I have to go back to the office - I forgot to lock the safe!"

The other partner replied, "What are you worried about? We're both here."


Were you ever arrested?
A lawyer was filling out a job application when he came to the question: "Have you ever been arrested?"

He answered no to the question.

The next question, intended for those who answered the preceding question with a yes, was "why?" Nevertheless, the lawyer answered it "Never got caught."


What is two plus two?
An engineer, a physicist, and a lawyer were being interviewed for a position as chief executive officer of a large corporation. The engineer was interviewed first, and was asked a long list of questions, ending with "How much is two plus two?" The engineer excused himself, and made a series of measurements and calculations before returning to the board room and announcing, "Four."

The physicist was next interviewed, and was asked the same questions. Again, the last question was, "How much is two plus two?" Before answering the last question, he excused himself, made for the library, and did a great deal of research. After a consultation with the United States Bureau of Standards and many calculations, he also announced, "Four."

The lawyer was interviewed last, and again the final question was, "How much is two plus two?" The lawyer drew all the shades in the room, looked outside to see if anyone was there, checked the telephone for listening devices, and then whispered, "How much do you want it to be?"


Is there a way to thank you?
"How can I ever thank you?" gushed a woman to Clarence Darrow, after he had solved her legal troubles.

"My dear woman," Darrow replied, "ever since the Phoenicians invented money there has been only one answer to that question."

Mistake of fact

Mistake OF Fact


An error that is not caused by the neglect of a legal duty on the part of the person committing the error but rather consists of an unconscious ignorance of a past or present material event or circumstance or a belief in the present existence of a material event that does not exist or a belief in the past existence of a material event that did not exist.

Mistake of fact can be a factor in reducing or eliminating civil liability or criminal culpability. A mistake of fact is of little consequence unless it is born of unconscious ignorance or forgetfulness. A person cannot escape civil or criminal liability for intentional mistakes.

In contract law a mistake of fact may be raised as a defense by a party seeking to avoid liability under the contract. Also, a mistake of fact can be used affirmatively to cancel, rescind, or reform a contract. A mistake of fact can affect a contract only if the mistaken fact was material, or important, to the agreement.

For example, assume that a bookseller has agreed to sell a copy of a Virginia Woolf novel that was signed by the late author. Assume further that the buyer is only interested in buying the book because it contains Woolf's signature. The seller knows this, and with an authentic signature the book fetches a very high price. If it is later discovered that the signature was actually forged decades earlier and neither the seller nor the buyer knew of the forgery, this would be a mistake of fact material to the deal, and the buyer would have the right to return the book and get her money back. This example illustrates a mutual mistake, or a material fact that is mistaken by both parties. In such a case, the party who is adversely affected by the mistake has the right to cancel or rescind the contract.

In the event of a unilateral mistake, only one party to the agreement is mistaken about a material fact. In such a case, the party adversely affected by the mistake will not be able to void the contract unless the other party knew or should have known of the mistake, or unless the other party had a duty to disclose the mistaken fact. For example, assume that a person owns an expensive sports car that is in perfect condition. Assume further that a neighbor asks the owner if he will sell the car, and the owner responds, "I will sell this car for thirty bills." If the neighbor returns with $30, no contract is formed because the neighbor mistakenly thought that the owner meant $30 when actually the owner was using slang for $30,000. Further, the neighbor should have known that an expensive sports car would not be sold for $30.

Sales of goods contract

The Sale of Goods Act 1979 (c.54) is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom which regulates contracts in which goods are sold and bought. The Act consolidates the original Sale of Goods Act 1893 and subsequent legislation, which in turn had codified and consolidated the law. Since 1979, there have been a number of minor statutory changes and additions to the 1979 Act, and a new consolidated Sale of Goods Act is perhaps overdue.

The Sale of Goods Act performs several functions. The Act lays down a small number of compulsory legal rules, but these restrictions are minimal: the bulk of the Act is concerned with an array of presumptions and implied terms, which aim to reflect the commercial expectations in the most commonly agreed sales contracts. In the absence of contrary agreement these terms will govern a contract within the Act's remit. The benefits in efficiency (through lower bargaining costs) and legal certainty have led to many jurisdictions adopting the legislation wholesale, and versions of the Sale of Goods Act have been adopted in almost all the former territories of the British Empire and Commonwealth (with the notable exception of Canada, which has adopted hybrid legislation incorporating elements of the US Uniform Commercial Code).

The Act applies to contracts where property in 'goods' is transferred or agreed to be transferred for a monetary consideration,[2] in other words: where property* in personal chattels is sold. (* Note that in this context, the word "property" means "ownership").

Companies Act 1965 (Act No. 125)
PART VI – ACCOUNTS AND AUDIT
DIVISION 1 – ACCOUNTS
SECTION 169A – RELIEF FROM REQUIREMENTS AS TO FORM AND CONTENT OF ACCOUNTS AND REPORTS



(1) The directors of a company may apply to the Registrar in writing for an order relieving them from any requirement of this Act relating to the form and content of accounts or consolidated accounts or to the form and content of the report required by section 169(6) and the Registrar may make such an order either unconditionally or on condition that the directors comply with such other requirements relating to the form and content of the accounts or consolidated accounts or report as the Registrar thinks fit to impose.

(2) The Registrar may where he considers it appropriate make an order in respect of any class of companies relieving the directors of a company in that class from compliance with any specified requirements of this Act relating to the form and content of accounts or consolidated accounts or to the form and content of the report required by section 169(6) and the order may be made either unconditionally or on condition that the directors of the company comply with such other requirements relating, to the form and content of accounts or consolidated accounts or report as the Registrar thinks fit to impose.

(3) The Registrar shall not make an order under subsection (1) unless he is of the opinion that compliance with the requirements of this Act would –

(i) render the accounts or consolidated accounts or report (as the case may be) misleading or inappropriate to the circumstances of the company; or

(ii) impose unreasonable burdens on the company or any officer of the company.

(4) The Registrar may make an order under subsection (1) which may be limited to a specific period and may from time to time either on application by the directors or without any such application (in which case the Registrar shall give to the directors an opportunity of being heard) revoke or suspend the operation of any such order.

Bahrain

Legal Review


A large part of the laws of Bahrain are based on published statutes, which derive from Shar'ia religious law. The Contract Law and Civil Wrongs Ordinance are based on principles of English common law, which were originally adopted during the British protectorate period. Much recent legislation is based upon and follows a civil-law format, much in the style of Egypt and France.

Judiciary :

General :

Bahrain's Civil and Commercial Procedures Law of 1971 provides the framework for the jurisdiction of the civil and commercial courts. Generally, the civil courts are composed of: (1) the Junior Court; (2) the High Court; (3) the High Court of Appeal; (4) the Court of Execution; and (5) the Summary Actions Court.

The Junior Court :

The Junior Court has jurisdiction to hear both civil and commercial cases of claims involving small sums, and cases involving certain real property rights. Junior Court cases may be appealed to the High Court.

The High Court :

The High Court has jurisdiction to hear all civil and commercial cases not falling within the jurisdiction of the Junior Court. The High Court is also authorized to hear cases concerning the personal status of non-Moslems and cases which are placed under its jurisdiction by law. The High Court also maintains jurisdiction over non-Bahraini citizens, including companies, that are resident or domiciled in Bahrain except in cases involving real property situated outside Bahrain. The High Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Junior Court and the Court of Execution. The High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of judgments from the Summary Actions Court. Judicial precedent followed by the High Court is set by decisions of the High Court of Appeal and the High Court of Justice sitting as a court of appeal.

The High Court of Appeal :

The High Court of Appeal sits as a court of appeal regarding all appeals made from the High Court.

The Execution Court :

The Execution Court has jurisdiction to execute all final judgments made by the Junior Court, the High Court and the High Court of Appeal.

The Summary Action Court :

The Summary Action Court hears claims that may be adversely affected by the lapse of time. Hearings are usually set to take place not less than twenty-four hours after the filing of an application for a summary trial, although, in cases of extreme urgency, this period can be reduced.

School OF Law

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Gonzales v. Oregon

Background of the case

Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006),[1] was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which ruled that the United States Attorney General could not enforce the federal Controlled Substances Act against physicians who prescribed drugs, in compliance with Oregon state law, for the assisted suicide of the terminally ill. It was the first major case heard under the leadership of Chief Justice John Roberts.

In 1994, voters in the state of Oregon approved Measure 16, a ballot initiative that established the Oregon Death with Dignity Act, by a margin of 31,962 votes, or 51.3%. The Act legalized physician-assisted suicide. A 1997 referral by the Oregon Legislative Assembly aimed to repeal the Death with Dignity Act, but was defeated by a 60% margin, with 220,445 votes cast against it. The law permits physicians to prescribe a lethal dose of medication to a patient agreed by two doctors to be within six months of dying from an incurable condition. As of 2006, 292 individuals had ended their lives under the law.[2][dead link]

On November 9, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued an Interpretive Rule that assisted-physician suicide was not a legitimate medical purpose, and that any physician administering federally controlled drugs for that purpose would be in violation of the Controlled Substances Act. The State of Oregon, joined by a physician, a pharmacist, and a group of terminally ill patients, all from Oregon, filed a challenge to the Attorney General's rule in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon.[3] The court ruled for Oregon and issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Interpretive Rule. The ruling was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

[edit] The Court's decision
In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Anthony Kennedy,[4] the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgment, but employed different reasoning. The majority opinion did not dispute the power of the federal government to regulate drugs, but disagreed that the statute in place empowered the U.S. Attorney General to overrule state laws determining what constituted the appropriate use of medications that were not themselves prohibited. The court found that it was inappropriate to apply Chevron deference toward the Attorney General's "interpretive rule" that controlled substances could not medically be used for the purpose of euthanasia.

[edit] Scalia's dissent
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, argued that under the Supreme Court precedent deference was due to the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute. He wrote that "[i]f the term 'legitimate medical purpose' has any meaning, it surely excludes the prescription of drugs to produce death".

[edit] Thomas's dissent
In addition to joining Justice Scalia's dissent, Justice Thomas also filed a brief dissent in which he argued that the court's majority opinion was inconsistent with the reasoning in Gonzales v. Raich. Thomas also dissented in that decision, in which five of the six justices in the majority in Oregon found broad federal authority under the Controlled Substances Act for Congress to forbid the growth of medical marijuana. Thomas had argued for a more limited congressional power under the Commerce Clause in Raich, which focused on intrastate vs. inter-state commerce. In Oregon, by contrast, the case was instead a matter of the validity of an executive interpretation of that statute. However, given that the majority in Raich was willing to ignore federalism concerns to effectively invalidate a California law permitting intrastate possession of medical marijuana, it was questionable as to why those same federalism concerns ought now be the basis for upholding an Oregon assisted suicide statute.

20 years behind bars .. for doing " NOTHING" !!

On 13 July 2009 David Gardner of the Daily Mail reported “Father accused of abuse is released after 20 years - as his children admit detectives treated them to ice cream”.

Hearing: Clyde Spencer's children told Vancouver County Superior Court that her father did not abuse her

A father was released after spending nearly 20 years behind bars for molesting his children – after his daughter claimed police investigating the alleged abuse fed her ice cream. Former police officer Clyde Spencer, now 61, was freed after his children admitted the abuse never happened. Kathryn Tetz said all she remembers about the allegations made when she was six-years-old was that detective Sharon Krause bought her ice cream.

When she finally read the police reports she was ‘absolutely sure’ her father hadn’t molested her. ‘I would have remembered something that graphic, that violent,’ Tetz told Clark County Superior Court in Vancouver, Washington. Her brother, Matthew Spencer, now 33, said he was nine at the time and claimed he only made the sex allegation after months of insistent questioning by Detective Krause. He said he just wanted the investigating officer to leave him alone.

Spencer’s sentence was commuted five years ago after questions arose about the conviction, including medical examinations that showed no evidence of child molestation, even though Krause called the abuse repeated and violent. He returned to court to try and clear his name and have the convictions overturned. He also wants his name wiped from the list of convicted sex offenders. Both children said that while growing up in California they were told by their mother, who divorced Spencer before he was charged, that they were blocking out the memory of the abuse.

They didn’t talk to their father for 20 years, but said they realised as adults the abuse never happened, and they came forward because it was the right thing to do. In 1985, Spencer was sentenced to two life terms in prison plus fourteen years. He was also convicted of abusing a four-year-old stepson. According to police, the children were together when they were abused, but Tetz and Matthew Spencer both testified that their stepbrother was never molested. However, prosecutors aren't yet conceding that their father was wrongly convicted.

Senior deputy prosecutor Kim Farr grilled the children about why they are so certain they weren't abused, and chief criminal deputy prosecutor Dennis Hunter said that if the convictions are dismissed, his office might appeal to the state Supreme Court. Matthew Spencer said his father had ruined the relationship with his mother and he had faults, ‘but none of them were molesting children.’ Both children had previously filed statements with the appeals court, but the judges required the hearing to ensure their new testimony held up under cross-examination.

Spencer hugged his son and daughter afterward while a dozen supporters cheered. ‘For so many years, nothing went right,’ he said. ‘When things keep going right, I keep waiting for the other shoe to drop.’ The hardest thing about his ordeal was missing his children, he said. ‘They were my life, and they were taken away from me,’ he added.